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LHWCA Section 905(b) and Scindia: The Confused 
Tale of a Legal Pendulum 
Thomas C. Galligan 
Brian C. Colomb** 
“Opinion is like a pendulum and obeys the same law. If it goes
past the centre of gravity on one side, it must go a like distance on
the other; and it is only after a certain time that it finds the true 
point at which it can remain at rest.” — Arthur Schopenhauer1 
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INTRODUCTION—A PENDULUM SWINGS
This Article is about a pendulum swing. It is about the shift in the 
liability of a vessel2 to a longshore worker3 injured while working on or
around the vessel. The Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation 
Act (LHWCA), originally passed in 1927, gives maritime workers, who 
are not seamen,4 workers’ compensation claims against their employers.
The LHWCA worker, however, has the right to sue the vessel on which he
or she worked in tort. For many years, the pendulum swung in favor of the 
longshore worker by providing the worker with a strict liability claim for
injuries caused by the vessel’s unseaworthy condition.5 In 1972, Congress 
swung the pendulum back the other way when it enacted 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 905(b), eliminating the unseaworthiness claim6 for a longshore worker 
2. In a later Part, we will discuss who the potential defendants might be in 
such a case. They include the vessel owner, a bareboat or demise charterer, a time 
charterer, a voyage charterer, and an owner pro hac vice. See 33 U.S.C. § 902(21) 
(2018). The vessel may also be liable in rem. Thus, throughout, we will refer to 
the “vessel” as the defendant.
3. When we use the phrase “longshore worker” or “LHWCA worker,” we 
mean someone covered by the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation
Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. § 901–50.
4. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G).
5. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 164 
(1981) (citing Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946)) (“Prior to 1972,
a longshoreman injured while loading or unloading a ship could receive
compensation payments and also have judgment against the shipowner if the
injury was caused by the ship’s unseaworthiness or negligence.”).
6. A seaworthy vessel is one that is reasonably fit for its intended use. To be
seaworthy, the vessel must be a reasonably fit place to live and work.
Concomitantly, an unseaworthy vessel is one that is not reasonably fit for its 
intended use. Thus, unseaworthiness is a condition of the ship—the condition of
not being reasonably fit. See, e.g., FRANK L. MARAIST, THOMAS C. GALLIGAN,
JR., CATHERINE M. MARAIST, & DEAN A. SUTHERLAND, ADMIRALTY IN A
NUTSHELL 239 (7th ed. 2017). It is a type of strict liability. Id. at 240. The
defendant need not have actual or constructive knowledge of the condition. A
341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd  29 4/15/20  8:48 AM
   
 
 
 
 
    
  
   
   
  
 
  
    
   
     
 
     
 
        
     
   
   
     
 
 
 
 
  
    
   
   
 
  
 
  
    
 
  
  
  
     
 
 
 
 
  
   
3072020] LHSCA SECTION 905(b) AND SCINDIA
covered by the LHWCA.7 In doing so, Congress took away the worker’s 
strict liability unseaworthiness claim, but it replaced it with a negligence 
(“vessel negligence”) action against the vessel.8 
With the passage of § 905(b), Congress expressly provided the 
longshore worker with a cause of action against the vessel for 
“negligence.”9 Thereafter, district courts and circuit courts across the
vessel may be unseaworthy because it is in disrepair, because it lacks necessary 
equipment, Webb v. Dresser Indus., 536 F.2d 603 (5th Cir. 1976), or if the owner
provides improper equipment. Vargas v. McNamara, 608 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1979).
An incompetent crew may render a vessel unseaworthy. Szymanski v. Columbia 
Transp. Co., 154 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 1998). A bellicose seaman may result in a 
finding of unseaworthiness. See, e.g., Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19
(1990). Any condition that renders the vessel unfit for ordinary use can render it
unseaworthy.
7. Although some argue that the 1972 LHWCA passage of § 905(b) totally
eliminated Sieracki seamen, the Fifth Circuit has held that a pocket of Sieracki seamen 
still exist—those workers injured on an unseaworthy vessel who are not covered by
the LHWCA. Aparicio v. Swan Lake, 643 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1981).
8. The claim can be in rem against the vessel, see Moore v. M/V Angela,
353 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2003), or against those responsible for the vessel in 
personam, Parker v. South Louisiana Contractors, Inc., 537 F.3d 113 (5th Cir. 
2008). Since this Article is about the substance of the claim, when we refer to a
claim against the vessel we are referring to both a possible in rem claim as well
as in personam claims against responsible parties. 
9. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) provides, in part:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by
the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled 
to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such 
vessel as a third party in accordance with the provisions of section 933 
of this title . . . .
Negligence is defined as the failure to exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances. U.S. FIFTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY CHARGE, § 4.11 (B)(4) (2011)
(defining negligence under the turnover duty as the failure to exercise reasonable
care under the circumstances). A person’s duty is to exercise that degree of care
that a reasonable person would exercise under the circumstances to protect against
foreseeable risk—a risk of which the person either knew or should have known.
Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2015). The court (or law)
provides or states the duty to the fact-finder who, in turn, determines whether there
is a breach of the duty—did the defendant, in fact, exercise reasonable care under 
the circumstances? To the extent that the court says more about the duty owed 
(thereby putting some condition on the general duty to exercise reasonable care), 
it creates overly detailed legal rules and encroaches on the fact-finder’s role of 
deciding breach. There may be good policy reasons for such encroachment in 
certain categories of cases, such as negligent infliction of emotional distress or 
negligence causing economic loss without any accompanying personal injury or
341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd  30 4/15/20  8:48 AM
   
 
 
 
  
   
      
 
 
 
    
   
 
   
   
    
    
   
   
   
  
    
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
    
    
  
 
 
 
    
    
     
 
    
 
 
  
     
 
308 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
country interpreted that term—“negligence”—differently and, in so doing,
conflated the questions of duty (what duty did the vessel owe?) and breach 
(did the vessel breach the relevant duty?). Thus, in § 905(b) cases, the issue
was: what duty did the vessel owe to LHWCA workers,10 the classic 
definition of negligence—reasonable care under the circumstances—or
some narrower duty? 
The first § 905(b) case to come before the Supreme Court was Scindia
Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. v. De Los Santos.11 Scindia involved a
longshore worker, employed by a stevedoring company (not the vessel),
who was injured during the loading of a ship. Justice Byron White, writing 
for the Court, initially defined the duty generally: “[T]he vessel owes . . . 
the stevedore and his longshoremen employees the duty of exercising due 
care ‘under the circumstances.’”12 The Court could have stopped there
because its decision would have mirrored Congressional intent and been 
consistent with the accepted definition of “negligence.” But Justice White
continued and added language conditioning or narrowing the § 905(b) 
vessel negligence duty for particular types of § 905(b) cases. In doing so, 
the Court allowed the vessel to essentially rely upon the expertise of the
LHWCA worker’s employer—the stevedore—in planning and carrying 
out the loading work. Justice White created a set of “sub”13-duties: (1) the
turnover duty; (2) the active control duty; and (3) the duty to intervene.14 
As discussed below, courts and leading commentators have opined that
property damage. That is, even though one normally has a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to protect against foreseeable risk, there may be sound reasons
based in policy, such as a concern courts and juries cannot reliably determine
causation for emotional distress or a concern for liability leading to administrative 
overload. But those reasons apply to broad categories of cases, not just to
particular cases arising before a court. Of course, whenever the court conditions
the basic duty to exercise reasonable care, it makes law and alters the fact-finder’s
role. The law it makes becomes part of the instruction to the jury defining the duty
that the defendant owed.
10. See 33 U.S.C. § 902(21).
11. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981).
12. Id. at 166 (citing Fed. Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co.,
394 U.S. 404, 415 (1969)).
13. We use the phrase “sub”-duties to mean particularized or detailed
elaborations or supposed refinements on the general duty to exercise reasonable
care. We also mean to convey that the particularization or detailed elaborations are
limitations on the otherwise applicable general duty to exercise reasonable care.
14. Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., 512 U.S. 92, 98 (1994) (citing Scindia,
451 U.S. at 167).
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3092020] LHSCA SECTION 905(b) AND SCINDIA
Justice White’s categories actually break down into six separate duties.15 
In articulating “sub”-duties that were narrower than the general duty to 
exercise reasonable care, the Court favored the vessel and disfavored the
worker, thereby pushing the liability pendulum past a general negligence
standard.
The Scindia Court was apparently concerned that articulating the
vessel’s duty as the general duty to exercise reasonable care—the 
traditional negligence standard—might allow strict liability to sneak back 
onto the scene through imputed negligence or the imposition of non-
delegable duties.16 Perhaps the Court’s conditional or narrowing language
was hortatory—urging lower courts not to resurrect strict liability through 
legal niceties. That is, it is possible to read Justice White’s discussion of 
“sub” (or restricted) duties in Scindia as merely dicta17 or simply part of a
general discussion of liability in the case before the Court. In admiralty,
absent some independent basis for federal jurisdiction, the court hears the 
case as fact-finder.18 Thus, judges, when analyzing negligence in admiralty 
cases, may not always clearly separate the duty and breach discussions as 
precisely as they must when there is a jury because they traditionally
decide both duty and breach. Although one might read Justice White’s
Scindia opinion as part of that tradition,19 that is not what courts have done.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 51–79. The six separate sub-duties 
stem from: turnover, which includes the sub-duties of: (1) turnover and (2) warn; 
active control, comprised of: (3) active involvement and (4) active control; and 
the duty to intervene, consisting of the sub-duties of: (5) inspection and 
supervision and (6) intervention. 
16. Scindia, 451 U.S. at 169 (“[C]reation of a shipowner’s duty to oversee
the stevedore’s activity and insure the safety of longshoremen would . . . saddle 
the shipowner with precisely the sort of nondelegable duty that Congress sought 
to eliminate by amending section 905(b).”) (quoting Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co.,
554 F.2d 1237, 1249–50, n.35 (3d Cir. 1977); Evans v. S.S. “Campeche,” 639 
F.2d 848, 856 (2d Cir. 1981)).
17. The case essentially seemed to involve only the question of whether the
vessel should have intervened in the operations of the stevedore.
18. There is no right to a jury trial in admiralty unless there is an independent 
basis for jurisdiction.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 
1947).  There, Judge Learned Hand both articulated and applied his famous
formula for negligence—is B < P x L? That is, is the burden (or cost) (B) of 
avoiding an accident beforehand less than the beforehand probability (P) of the
anticipated loss (L) if the accident occurs? If so, the defendant is negligent; if not,
the defendant is not negligent. In articulating the formula, Judge Hand articulated 
the duty owed. In applying it, he decided breach, which was all perfectly fine
because it was not a jury trial.
341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd  32 4/15/20  8:48 AM
   
 
 
 
     
    
    
  
    
     
    
   
   
    
    
   
   
  
       
   
   
      
   
    
     
   
 
   
  
   
 
  
 
   
 
 
   
      
  
 
   
   
  
310 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Indeed, the Supreme Court itself treated the Scindia sub-duties as settled
rules of law when it next considered a vessel’s § 905(b) duty to a longshore
worker in Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., S.A.20 Thus, the six sub-duties
have displaced a general duty to exercise reasonable care, even though §
905(b) uses the single, simple word “negligence.” The state of the law today
is that the vessel’s duties to the stevedore worker are defined by the three 
Scindia categories. The duty is not simply to exercise reasonable care under
the circumstances; the vessel’s duty is defined differently in different
contexts, and the stevedore’s expertise and the obviousness of the risk are
key factors in defining the vessel’s obligation. This reality can create serious
problems in a case tried to a jury where the instructions must incorporate the
confusing and complex Scindia/Howlett verbiage. It is also a problem
because conflating the duty and breach questions turn case specific breach
decisions into arguable duty decisions. The breach question is a mixed 
question of fact and law with no predictive force for the next case. A duty
decision is a legal decision with potential precedential value. Thus, a “no
duty” decision can form the basis for future jury charges or a motion for
summary judgment. Although jury charges are only an issue when a jury is
hearing the case, mixed questions (breach) masquerading as legal questions
(no duty) are an issue in any case and may prompt summary judgment
motions arguing the plaintiff has no legal claim where the real issue is
breach. Conflation of duty and breach can, in short, lead to judges deciding
cases on the basis of no duty where the real issue is breach.
Although the Scindia/Howlett sub-duties have proven problematic 
enough in the stevedore context, lower courts have exacerbated the 
problem by going beyond the Supreme Court’s § 905(b) decisions and
applying the Scindia analytical construct beyond the factual situation in
which it arose: the vessel’s duty to a longshoreman loading a ship and 
employed by an independent stevedore. Lower courts have applied the
Scindia duties to various categories of workers who are covered by the
LHWCA but have no relation to the loading or unloading of cargo on 
vessels, including dual capacity cases.21 For instance, in dual capacity
cases, an employer engaged in a maritime construction project that uses 
its own vessels in doing the work will wear two hats: as an employer of
construction workers and as the owner–operator of vessels on navigable 
waters. There, the LHWCA worker sues the employer in its capacity as
vessel owner and not in the employer capacity. There, the work the
employee does on the vessel may have absolutely nothing to do with
20. Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., 512 U.S. 92 (1994).
21. Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit, J/V, 97 F.3d 603 (1st Cir. 1996); Castorina 
v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 758 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1985).
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3112020] LHSCA SECTION 905(b) AND SCINDIA
loading and unloading vessels, and yet courts still apply the Scindia
analytical schemata.
The pendulum has radically swung in the vessel’s favor. With Scindia
and its progeny, the pendulum’s pro-vessel swing has gone beyond the
simple and articulated negligence standard. The restricted, narrowed
Scindia sub-duties make the plaintiff’s burden heavier than it would be in 
an ordinary negligence suit. In fact, in some instances, the lower courts’
application of the sub-duties has made it virtually impossible for the
injured worker to recover.
It is time for the courts to push the pendulum back to where Congress
intended—negligence. Today, 46 years after the passage of § 905(b), there
is little danger of a surreptitious return to the days when the vessel was 
strictly liable to the worker under the doctrine of unseaworthiness.
Moreover, the weight of Scindia’s pointillist sub-duty scheme constrains 
and confuses what should be much simpler negligence cases. Conditioning 
and limiting the duty of reasonable care inevitably makes duty 
determinations more dependent on factual analysis. As noted, that reality
leads to motions for summary judgment where factual issues are cast as
legal issues. Further, the narrower duties alter the role of the fact-finder, 
decreasing its authority and increasing the authority of the court. For these
reasons, it is time to simplify the law and apply it as Congress intended. It
is time for the pendulum to swing back and find its resting place in the
middle where the vessel owner is not strictly liable to the LHWCA worker,
but it is liable if it is negligent, that is, if it fails to exercise reasonable care
under the circumstances.
The Court should replace the Scindia duties with a general duty to
exercise reasonable care under which the expertise of the stevedore and 
the obviousness of the injury-causing conditions are all factors relevant to
a breach determination, rather than limits on the defendant’s duty. In the 
meantime, lower courts should be wary of granting summary judgment
based on stevedore expertise or anticipation and on obviousness of the risk
because in the maritime employment setting, those issues are fact specific, 
often demand expert testimony, and are beyond the knowledge of the 
typical judge. Separating the duty determination from the breach
determination will bring clarity to the law, whether the case is a jury case 
or tried to the court.
In Part I, we describe the legal landscape before Congress passed
§ 905(b). In Part II, we discuss and parse the five sentences of § 905(b).
Part III analyzes Scindia and its articulated sub-duties. Parts IV, V, and VI
discuss the subsequent development and critique the turnover, active
control, and intervention duties. Part VII deals with the potential defendants
341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd  34 4/15/20  8:48 AM
   
 
 
 
    
  
    
    
 
  
 
   
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
    
   
    
 
  
  
    
    
 
 
 
   
    
         
 
     
 
 
    
          
 
    
312 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
in a § 905(b) action, and Part VIII offers our recommendations and
conclusions.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND—A PAGE OR TWO OF HISTORY
In The Osceola,22 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized as “settled”23 
that “the vessel and her owner are, both by English and American law,
liable to an indemnity for injuries received by seamen in consequence of
the unseaworthiness of the ship.” Despite that fact, Gilmore and Black 
wrote that “[u]ntil the mid 1940s the seaman’s right to recover damages
for injuries caused by unseaworthiness of the ship was an obscure and little 
used remedy.”24 In the 1940s, two significant developments brought
unseaworthiness to center stage. 
First, in 1944, the Court expanded the concept of unseaworthiness to 
include any unreasonably dangerous condition of the vessel, and the Court 
made clear that the liability for unseaworthiness was strict liability.25 And 
unseaworthiness was not based on any particular act of vessel negligence.
Liability did not depend upon the negligence or knowledge of the vessel.26 
If the ship was not reasonably fit for its purposes—if some condition of 
the ship rendered it unreasonably dangerous—the vessel was liable. The 
condition might be with the vessel itself if it had an inadequate crew or a 
defective engine. The condition might arise from inadequate equipment
being provided or from an unqualified crew member. The condition might 
even arise because of a bellicose crew member. Although negligence was
not required to establish unseaworthiness, there was a significant overlap
because negligence could be one of the ways in which the vessel became
unseaworthy.27 
The second major 1940s development in the law of unseaworthiness
was the Supreme Court’s decision in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki.28 In
Sieracki, the Court held that the vessel owner’s duty to provide a vessel
that was not unseaworthy extended to a longshore worker who was injured
22. 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
23. Id. at 175. 
24. GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY
383 (2d ed. 1975).
25. Mahnich v. S. S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); see alsoWalter I. Lanier, Jr., 
The Doctrine of Unseaworthiness in the Law of Maritime Personal Injuries, 21 
La. L. Rev. 755 (1961).
26. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
27. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 24, at 22; cf. Usner v. Luckenbach
Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494 (1971).
28. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
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3132020] LHSCA SECTION 905(b) AND SCINDIA
while unloading its vessel, even though the worker was not employed by 
the vessel owner. The Court extended the duty because the worker was 
“doing a seaman’s work and incurring a seaman’s hazards.”29 Sieracki led
to a plethora of suits by longshore workers injured while loading or
unloading vessels. These workers became known as “Sieracki seamen.”30 
Sieracki also led to the Court’s decision in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v.
Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.31 
Ryan recognized a vessel’s right to recover from the stevedore—often
the injured longshore worker’s employer—for the damages it paid to the
longshore worker injured by the vessel’s unseaworthy condition when the 
condition was created by the stevedore.32 Specifically, Ryan held that the
stevedore, by virtue of its contract with the vessel owner, impliedly 
warranted its workmanlike performance to the shipowner.33 Consequently, 
the shipowner was entitled to full indemnity if the plaintiff's employer 
breached this implied warranty.34 This right to indemnity, arising out of
the implied warranty of workmanlike performance, was commonly
referred to as “Ryan indemnity.”
In short, the longshore worker, who qualified as a Sieracki seaman,
could recover his or her tort damages from the vessel if the injury was the 
result of an unseaworthy condition. In turn, the vessel could then recover 
indemnity from the longshore worker’s employer whose only direct 
liability to the worker was for LHWCA workers’ compensation benefits. 
In other words, the employer essentially and effectively would have to pay 
its injured employee unseaworthiness tort damages despite its statutory
immunity under the LHWCA.
Thereafter, pushing the pendulum even further in the worker’s favor,
the Supreme Court, in Reed v. The Steamship Yaka,35 considered the case 
where the Sieracki seaman was employed by the vessel itself—that is, the
plaintiff’s employer was the vessel defendant.36 In Reed, the Court allowed 
the Sieracki seaman to sue his own employer for unseaworthiness.37 
Allowing the worker to recover from the employer in tort, despite the 
29. Id. at 99.
30. SeeGILMORE & BLACK, supra note 24, at 441. 
31. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
32. Id. at 126.
33. Id. at 133–34.
34. Id. at 133.
35. Reed v. S.S. Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963).
36. In Reed, the employer was a charterer of the vessel, and that was the
capacity in which the employee sued it. 
37. Id. at 412.
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314 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
exclusive remedy provisions of the LHWCA, sidestepped the tort 
immunity the LHWCA employer would otherwise enjoy.
After Sieracki, Ryan, and Reed, the pendulum had swung radically in
the longshore worker’s favor. When injured by an unseaworthy condition, 
the longshore worker could recover LHWCA benefits from the employer 
and full tort damages from the vessel. Vessel defendants were unhappy 
because they were exposed to strict liability for unseaworthiness to
non-seamen. They were also unhappy because their own employees could
sue them in tort if the court determined the employees were Sieracki
seamen. Of course, the vessel was relieved of its unseaworthiness liability
to a non-employee Sieracki seaman under Ryan because it could recover
indemnity from the otherwise immune employer of the injured longshore 
worker. In turn, the employer found itself effectively liable for full tort
damages, even though the longshore worker’s exclusive remedy against it,
as the statute itself stated, was workers’ compensation benefits.38 At the
end of the day, the only person certain to be content with the post-Reed 
legal landscape was the Sieracki seaman39 who was injured by an 
unseaworthy condition. Then, Congress entered the fray in 1972, and the
pendulum swung the other way.
II. SECTION 905(B)—FIVE FRUSTRATING AND FLABBERGASTING 
SENTENCES
In 1972, Congress decided to increase LHWCA benefits, to extend 
coverage for those benefits landward, and to change the law described
above. It changed the jurisprudence described in the previous Part by
passing 33 U.S.C.A. § 905(b), which it then partially amended in 1988.40 
Today, the statute provides:
38. The vessel would not be relieved of liability, however, if the direct
employer was insolvent or, as noted, if the vessel itself directly employed the 
injured worker, as in Reed. In the latter case, the worker could still recover full 
damages from the vessel/employer even though, as employer, the statute 
expressly limited its liability to LHWCA benefits.
39. And the worker’s attorney.
40. The 1988 amendments to § 905(b) amended the third sentence to provide, 
as set forth above: 
If such person was employed to provide shipbuilding, repairing, or 
breaking services and such person’s employer was the owner, owner pro 
hac vice, agent, operator, or charterer of the vessel, no such action shall 
be permitted, in whole or in part or directly or indirectly, against the
injured person’s employer (in any capacity, including as the vessel’s 
owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, operator, or charterer) or against the
employees of the employer.
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3152020] LHSCA SECTION 905(b) AND SCINDIA
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused
by the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone 
otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may
bring an action against such vessel as a third party in accordance 
with the provisions of section 33 of this title, and the employer
shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or 
indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall 
be void. If such person was employed by the vessel to provide
stevedoring services, no such action shall be permitted if the injury 
was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing 
stevedoring services to the vessel. If such person was employed to 
provide shipbuilding, repairing, or breaking services and such 
person’s employer was the owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, 
operator, or charterer of the vessel, no such action shall be
permitted, in whole or in part or directly or indirectly, against the 
injured person’s employer (in any capacity, including as the
vessel’s owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, operator, or charterer)
or against the employees of the employer. The liability of the 
vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty
of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury
occurred. The remedy provided in this subsection shall be 
exclusive of all other remedies against the vessel except remedies
available under this chapter.41 
An initial parsing of the statute will prove beneficial and, frankly,
essential.
The first sentence grants the LHWCA worker a “negligence” claim
against the vessel. Read literally, the LHWCA worker should recover from
the vessel if the vessel was negligent—in common parlance, if the vessel
The original version of the statute provided: 
If such person was employed by the vessel to provide ship building, or 
repair services, no such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused
by the negligence of persons engaged in providing ship building or repair
services to the vessel. 
Under the original version, the shipbuilder or ship repairer had no negligence
action against the owner if his or her injury was caused by the negligence of 
someone engaged to provide shipbuilding or ship repair services, just as the 
stevedore was denied a negligence action if his or her injuries were caused by 
someone engaged to perform stevedoring services. Under the 1988 version of the
statute, the shipbuilder, ship repairer, or ship breaker has no action against the
vessel owner, in any capacity, no matter what or who caused the injury. The
stevedore has greater rights, as discussed herein. 
41. 33 U.S.C.A. § 905(b) (West 2018).
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316 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. The first
sentence also grants the negligence claim against the vessel “as a third party”
claim, meaning that even if the vessel owner is also the LHWCA worker’s
employer, the worker can still recover tort damages against his or her
employer in its vessel capacity. To that extent, some of the spirit of Reed
lives on—the LHWCA worker has a tort action against his or her employer
in its vessel capacity, albeit for negligence, but not unseaworthiness, as
discussed in the next paragraph. In this regard, the LHWCA worker has
rights that many land-based workers do not have, since land-based 
workers’ compensation schemes frequently provide the employer with 
immunity from employee negligence actions that arise in the course and
scope of employment.42 
While the first sentence of § 905(b) giveth the LHWCA worker a 
negligence action against a vessel, including when the vessel is also the 
worker’s employer, the fourth sentence taketh away. It provides: “The
liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon the
warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury 
occurred.” The fourth sentence takes away the LHWCA worker’s right to
recover against the vessel for unseaworthiness (strict liability). It overrules
Sieracki, at least for workers covered by the LHWCA.43 
So, what about Ryan indemnity? The first sentence does away with it:
“[T]he employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages [that 
the LHWCA worker recovers in the vessel negligence action provided in 
this section] directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the
contrary shall be void.” Thus, the Ryan indemnity based on the warranty
of workmanlike performance is gone, at least in actions brought by 
LHWCA workers.44 Also, the first sentence of § 905(b) provides that any 
42. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1032 (2018). Interestingly, the legislative
history of § 905(b) states that Congress wanted to place the longshore worker: “in 
the same position he would be if he were injured in non-maritime employment
ashore . . . and not to endow him with any special maritime theory of liability or 
cause of action under whatever judicial nomenclature it may be called, such as
‘unseaworthiness’, ‘non-delegable duty’, or the like.” S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 10 
(1972) [hereinafter Rep.] (H.R. REP. NO. 92-1441 (1972), U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 1972, 4698, is in all relevant respects identical to the Senate 
Report.). Of course, by giving the longshore worker a negligence action against
the employer, Congress still left the longshore worker in a better position than the
land-based worker. 
43. Some courts have concluded that Sieracki lives on for workers who are
injured by a vessel but who are neither seamen nor LHWCA workers (because of 
an exclusion from coverage). See, e.g., Aparicio v. Swan Lake, 643 F.2d 1109
(5th Cir. 1981).
44. See supra note 43.
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3172020] LHSCA SECTION 905(b) AND SCINDIA
agreement providing for the vessel to indemnify a third-party tortfeasor
for damages recovered in a § 905(b) action is also void.
The second sentence of § 905(b) limits the right of an injured 
stevedore to recover for vessel negligence if the injury was caused by the
negligence of others engaged in providing stevedoring services to the
vessel. The goal of the sentence seems clear: if the stevedore’s injuries are
caused by a co-employee stevedore, the vessel is not liable in negligence.45 
The third sentence of § 905(b) expressly deprives the shipbuilder, ship
repairer, and ship breaker of any vessel negligence action against his or
her employer. Finally, the last sentence states that the remedies against the
vessel provided in § 905(b) are exclusive. In the next Part, we turn to how
the Supreme Court has interpreted and applied the five sentences that make
up § 905(b)—albeit, solely in the context of stevedores hired to load and 
unload cargo from vessels—pushing the pendulum past negligence and
further in the pro-vessel direction.
45. But one may wonder if the sentence goes too far. As Professor Maraist
and one of your authors wrote concerning the second sentence of § 905(b):
The second sentence of § 905(b) limits an employee’s right to recover
for vessel negligence if the employee was injured by someone providing 
stevedoring services to the vessel. The sentence clearly applies where the 
shipowner hires an independent contractor stevedore and an employee of
the stevedore injures another employee of the stevedore. However, under
such circumstances, the vessel owner ordinarily would not be liable 
under general tort principles. If the vessel owner employs its own
employees as stevedores and one employee injures another, the sentence
indicates that the injured employee would not have a vessel negligence
claim against the employer-vessel owner. What is not so clear is the 
result when a longshore worker is employed by an independent
contractor but is injured by a longshore worker employed directly by the
vessel owner.
FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., PERSONAL INJURY IN
ADMIRALTY 147 (LEXIS Publishing 2000) (emphasis added). In reference to the
last quoted sentence, it is not apparent under general tort vicarious liability 
principles why the vessel owner, acting as stevedore (in part), would not be liable
for its employee’s fault in causing injury to a third-party longshore worker. In 
such a case, the vessel owner is liable as stevedore, not as vessel owner, and the 
protection (immunity) that a literal reading of the statute would provide seems 
gratuitous and unintended.
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318 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
III. SCINDIA STEAM NAVIGATION CO., LTD. V. DE LOS SANTOS—THE 
PENDULUMKEEPS SWINGING AWAY FROM LHWCAWORKER 
RECOVERY
As previously noted, § 905(b) gives the longshore worker a cause of
action for negligence against the vessel owner. The statute does not, nor
need not, define negligence. The clearest and simplest way to explain the 
concept of negligence is to say that one has a duty to exercise reasonable
care to protect another from foreseeable risk.46 To apply that elegantly
simple concept to the § 905(b) vessel negligence action, the courts could 
have said the vessel owner owed the independent longshore worker a duty 
to exercise reasonable care. Such a pure articulation of the vessel’s duty
would have been consistent with the plain language of § 905(b) and 
general maritime tort law doctrine.
For instance, in its landmark 1959 general maritime negligence decision,
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,47 the Court eschewed
common law and Restatement (Second) of Tort rules governing the
negligence liability of owners and occupiers of land. Instead, the Court
succinctly stated: “. . . the owner of a ship in navigable waters owes to all who
are on board for purposes not inimical to his legitimate interests the duty of
exercising reasonable care under the circumstances of each case.”48 Ten years
later, inFederalMarine Terminals v. Burnside Shipping Co., 49 the Court once
again set forth the duty in concise, economic, and simple terms, holding that
“federal maritime law does impose on the shipowner a duty to the stevedoring
contractor of due care under the circumstances . . . .”50 
Articulating the vessel’s duty under § 905(b) in clear, common, and 
concise basic negligence terms would have been sensible and consistent
with basic tort doctrine and the language of the statute. As mentioned 
above, the duty for negligence is to exercise reasonable care to protect 
against foreseeable risk. Whether the defendant fulfilled that duty or
breached it is a mixed question of fact and law for the fact-finder. Duty in 
negligence is a legal issue. The duty is relatively straightforward, and the
46. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 30 (2d ed. 1955).
47. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
48. Id. at 632.
49. Fed. Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404 (1969).
50. Id. at 416–17. The Court proceeded to hold that the stevedore had a
“direct action in tort against the shipowner to recover the amount of compensation 
payments occasioned by the latter’s negligence.” Id. at 417. In so holding, the 
Court recognized a claim for negligently inflicted pure economic loss. Cf. Robins
Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. 
M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985).
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3192020] LHSCA SECTION 905(b) AND SCINDIA
duty to exercise reasonable care applies to broad categories of cases, not
just the case before the court.51 It is in determining breach of the duty to 
exercise reasonable care that the fact-finder considers the details of the 
particular case; this is a messier determination. A breach determination in 
one case has little or no predictive value for the results in future cases.
When a court, especially the Supreme Court, articulates the relevant duty 
in a more case specific manner, it runs the risk of creating overly focused 
or picayune rules. In such instances, the Court runs the risk of invading the
fact-finder’s realm. This invasion is precisely what has happened in 
§ 905(b) vessel negligence cases.
In Scindia, Lauro de los Santos worked as a stevedore for Seattle
Stevedore Co. Seattle contracted with Scindia Steamship Navigation 
Company to load its cargo of wheat into the hold of Scindia’s ship, the 
M/S Jalaratna. The stevedores used a winch, which was a part of the ship’s 
gear, to lower wooden pallets containing 50-pound sacks of wheat into the 
hold. The stevedore operator of the winch could not see when to stop and 
start lowering pallets into the hold, and so he relied on a co-employee— 
the hatch tender—to signal him when to do so. Santos was in the hold
removing sacks of wheat and stowing them. For two days prior to the 
incidents giving rise to the lawsuit, the braking mechanism on the winch 
was not functioning properly—it would not immediately stop a loaded
pallet, but would continue to drop several feet before coming to a stop.
Then, on the third day, the hatch tender signaled the winch operator to
stop the lowering of a particular pallet. Despite the winch operator’s
response to the signal and because of the winch’s malfunctioning, the 
pallet did not stop. Instead, it struck an object and spilled about half its
load. The operator then raised the load 15 feet, and the hatch tender 
allowed Santos and his co-workers to clear away the spilled sacks.
Unfortunately, either because the loaded pallet above the workers was still 
swinging—like a pendulum—or because the winch brake slipped again
51. Pitre v. La. Tech Univ., 673 So. 2d 585, 596 (La. 1996) (Lemmon, J.,
concurring) (“The statement that ‘the defendant had no duty,’ as noted in
Professor David W. Robertson et al., Cases and Materials on Torts 161 (1989),
should be reserved for those ‘situations controlled by a rule of law of enough
breadth and clarity to permit the trial judge in most cases raising the problem to
dismiss the complaint or award summary judgment for defendant on the basis of
the rule.’ Thus, a ‘no duty’ defense generally applies when there is a categorical
rule excluding liability as to whole categories of claimants or of claims under any 
circumstances. In the usual case where the duty owed depends upon the
circumstances of the particular case, analysis of the defendant’s conduct should 
be done in terms of ‘no liability’ or ‘no breach of duty.’”).
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320 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
three or four times, Santos was hit by additional sacks falling from the
pallet above. He sued Scindia, claiming § 905(b) vessel negligence.
To determine Scindia’s duty to Santos, the district court relied upon 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 343 and 343A (1965),52 addressing the
duty owed by a landowner to an invitee. Interestingly, in Kermarec, the
Court had refused to apply the land-based analysis of a landowner’s duty 
to someone on his or her property in the context of analyzing the duty of
care a vessel owner owed to a visitor.53 The Ninth Circuit in Scindia
disagreed with the trial court because it believed those Restatement
sections improperly incorporated notions of contributory negligence and
assumption of the risk, which are inapplicable in maritime law because
maritime law has a pure comparative fault regime.54 Instead, the Ninth 
Circuit articulated the standard of care as follows:
A vessel is subject to liability for injuries to longshoremen working 
on or near the vessel caused by conditions on the vessel if, but only
if, the shipowner (a) knows of, or by the exercise of reasonable care
would discover, the condition, and should realize that it involves an
unreasonable risk of harm to such longshoremen, and (b) the
shipowner fails to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: DANGEROUS CONDITIONS KNOWN
TO OR DISCOVERABLE BY POSSESSOR § 343 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his
invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the
condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of
harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or 
will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
* * *
§ 343A Known or Obvious Dangers
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm 
caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is
known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the 
harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.
(2) In determining whether the possessor should anticipate harm from
a known or obvious danger, the fact that the invitee is entitled to make
use of public land, or of the facilities of a public utility, is a factor of 
importance indicating that the harm should be anticipated.
53. Kermarec, 358 U.S. at 630–32.
54. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
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3212020] LHSCA SECTION 905(b) AND SCINDIA
to protect the longshoremen against the danger.55 
That statement was a relatively straightforward and clear articulation of 
the general duty in a negligence case—reasonable care under the 
circumstances. It was also consistent with what the Court said in Kermarec
and in Burnside Shipping. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and wrote 
a detailed opinion, interpreting § 905(b) for the first time.
The simplest and clearest course for the Supreme Court was to adopt
the clear and consistent standard the Ninth Circuit had articulated and 
applied in the case and hold that the vessel owner had a duty to exercise
reasonable care in a § 905(b) vessel negligence action. In fact, that is what
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, said in a 
concurrence, essentially arguing for a general duty to exercise reasonable 
care.56 That interpretive route would also have been consistent with the
plain meaning rule—giving the word negligence in the statute its accepted
meaning. Although that would have been the simplest and perhaps most
useful definition of negligence, the Court, in Justice White’s opinion,
focused on other considerations. First, because Congress had just done 
away with the Sieracki unseaworthiness action,57 the Court was concerned 
that a simple statement that the vessel owner owed a duty to exercise
reasonable care might effectively revive Sieracki.58 That is, courts might
allow a type of strict liability to creep back into the law under the guise of 
55. De Los Santos v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 598 F.2d 480, 485 (9th 
Cir. 1979), aff’d and remanded, 451 U.S. 156 (1981).
56. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 179–80 
(1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
57. Sieracki survives, in part, for workers who are not covered by the
LHWCA.
58. Scindia, 451 U.S. 156. 
[W]e cannot agree that the vessel’s duty to the longshoreman requires
the shipowner to inspect or supervise the stevedoring operation. 
Congress intended to make the vessel answerable for its own negligence
and to terminate its automatic, faultless responsibility for conditions
caused by the negligence or other defaults of the stevedore. . . . It would 
be inconsistent with the Act to hold, nevertheless, that the shipowner has
a continuing duty to take reasonable steps to discover and correct
dangerous conditions that develop during the loading or unloading
process. Such an approach would repeatedly result in holding the 
shipowner solely liable for conditions that are attributable to the 
stevedore, rather than the ship. True, the liability would be cast in terms
of negligence rather than unseaworthiness, but the result would be much 
the same.
Id. at 168–69.
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322 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
negligence through the imposition of duties—perhaps nondelegable
duties—to discover or know of risks on board or associated with the ship.
This concern is clearly apparent in Justice Powell’s concurrence, in which
Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice Powell wrote:
The difficulty with a more general reasonableness standard like 
that adopted by the court below is that it fails to deal with the 
problems of allocating responsibility between the stevedore and 
the shipowner. It may be that it is “reasonable” for a shipowner to
rely on the stevedore to discover and avoid most obvious hazards. 
But when, in a suit by longshoreman, a jury is presented with the 
single question whether it was “reasonable” for the shipowner to
fail to take action concerning a particular obvious hazard, the jury 
will be quite likely to find liability.59 
Second, and relatedly, the Court concerned itself with the general truth 
that the stevedore was an expert vis-à-vis the task it was performing:
loading and unloading. On that score, the § 905(b) standard of care 
question is:
[A] most difficult issue: what duty does a vessel owner owe to the
employee of an independent contractor (the stevedore) who has
contracted to provide services to the vessel and who has assumed
control over part of the vessel? This is similar to the difficulties 
encountered when a landowner surrenders control of a portion of
his premises to a repair person whom he has engaged to repair the 
premises, and the repair person or his employee is injured as a 
result of the condition of the premises. Many courts hold that,
although the landowner may owe some duty to the repair person,
the landowner is entitled to rely upon the expertise of the repair
person to do the work safely and encounter anticipated defects
cautiously.60 
Of course, the shipowner is not a landowner, and the Court rejected
treating a shipowner as a landowner in Kermarec.
59. Id. at 181 (Powell, J., concurring).
60. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 45, at 148–49. Prior to the passage of 
§ 905(b) and Scindia, the Court dealt with the repairperson issue. In West v.
United States, 361 U.S. 118 (1959), the Court considered whether the defendant
shipowner should be exonerated because the defect in the vessel was not hidden
and the vessel owner was under no duty to protect the employee “from risks that 
were inherent in the carrying out of the contract” to repair the vessel. West, 361 
U.S. at 123.
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3232020] LHSCA SECTION 905(b) AND SCINDIA
In Scindia, Justice White, speaking for the Court, did initially note
that, in Burnside Shipping, the Court held the shipowner owed to the 
stevedore and his employees the duty to exercise reasonable care.61 He 
went on, however, to say more—much more—and, in saying more, he 
limited the duty the vessel owner owed to the stevedore worker. Justice
White limited the vessel’s general obligation to exercise reasonable care 
and articulated sub-duties, or conditional or restricted duties.62 He said, in 
part:
This [§ 905(b)] duty extends at least to exercising ordinary care
under the circumstances to have the ship and its equipment in such 
condition that an expert and experienced stevedore will be able by
the exercise of reasonable care to carry on its cargo operations
with reasonable safety to persons and property, and to warning the 
stevedore of any hazards on the ship or with respect to its
equipment that are known to the vessel or should be known to it
in the exercise of reasonable care, that would likely be 
encountered by the stevedore in the course of his cargo operations 
and that are not known by the stevedore and would not be obvious
to or anticipated by him if reasonably competent in the
performance of his work. . . . The shipowner thus has a duty with 
respect to the condition of the ship’s gear, equipment, tools, and 
work space to be used in the stevedoring operations; and if he fails 
at least to warn the stevedore of hidden danger which would have 
been known to him in the exercise of reasonable care, he has 
breached his duty and is liable if his negligence causes injury to a
longshoreman. Petitioner concedes as much.63 
Courts have come to call the duties Justice White described above as the 
“turnover duty.” The turnover duty has two parts: (1) a duty to exercise
reasonable care to turn over to the stevedore a reasonably safe ship; and 
(2) a duty to warn of risks of which the shipowner is or should be aware.64 
Both the sub-duties, however, have major limiting factors, as will be 
discussed below.
After articulating the turnover duty, the Court continued:
It is also accepted that the vessel may be liable if it actively
61. Scindia, 451 U.S. at 166.
62. Id. at 166–79.
63. Id. at 166–67.
64. THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 7–10 (5th 
ed. 2011).
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324 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
involves itself in the cargo operations and negligently injures a 
longshoreman or if it fails to exercise due care to avoid exposing 
longshoremen to harm from hazards they may encounter in areas,
or from equipment, under the active control of the vessel during
the stevedoring operation.65 
This became known as the “active control” duty—the duty to exercise
ordinary care to protect a longshore worker from a foreseeable risk in an 
area under the vessel’s active control. Professor Schoenbaum breaks the 
active control duty into two separate sub-duties: (1) the active involvement
duty; and (2) the active control duty.66 The former applies where the vessel
participates or takes control of cargo operations.67 The latter involves
situations where the stevedore worker is harmed by a risk in an area still
under the active control of the vessel and might include “physical areas on
or near the ship, . . . equipment, or . . . the work of independent
contractors.”68 
Interestingly, the active control sub-duties are somewhat different than 
the turnover duties because the active control duties describe the 
circumstances under which a duty to exercise reasonable care arise: active
involvement in the work and control. Alternatively, the turnover duties 
condition or restrict the general duty to exercise reasonable care. That said, 
the Court missed a simpler opportunity, in the involvement and control
contexts, to say there were occasions in which the general duty to exercise
reasonable care applies. The labeling adds little analytical content.
Finally, the Court articulated and considered the vessel owner’s 
obligation to intervene in the work of the stevedore. The Court said:
[A]bsent contract provision, positive law, or custom to the
contrary, . . . the shipowner has no general duty by way of
supervision or inspection to exercise reasonable care to discover
dangerous conditions that develop within the confines of the cargo 
operations that are assigned to the stevedore.69 
Therefore, there is no general duty to inspect or supervise the cargo
operations—but what happens when the vessel owner learns an apparently
dangerous condition exists or has developed in the cargo operations that 
may cause injury to a maritime employee and the stevedore is also aware
65. Scindia, 451 U.S. at 167.
66. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 64, at 636.
67. This is akin to an actor assuming a duty where he or she might not
otherwise have had a duty to act.  
68. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 64, at 637.
69. Scindia, 451 U.S. at 172.
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3252020] LHSCA SECTION 905(b) AND SCINDIA
of the condition? According to Justice White, the vessel owner normally
may rely on the stevedore’s judgment that the condition does not present 
an unreasonable risk of harm, but the owner may have a duty to intervene
if the stevedore employer’s judgment is “so obviously improvident 
that . . . [the vessel owner], if it knew of the defect and that . . . [the 
stevedore] was continuing to use it, should have realized the . . . [situation] 
presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the longshoremen . . . .”70 
Once again, Professor Schoenbaum breaks this duty to intervene into 
two prongs, or sub-duties: (1) the duty to supervise and inspect (triggered
by a contract provision, positive law, or custom);71 and (2) the duty to
intervene (triggered by the vessel’s knowledge of the stevedore’s
obviously improvident judgment).72 
Consequently, Justice White in Scindia managed to extrapolate six
separate duties73 from one word in the statute—negligence. They are, to 
recap: turnover, which includes the sub-duties of: (1) turnover and
(2) warn; active control, comprised of: (3) active involvement and
(4) active control; and the duty to intervene, consisting of the sub-duties
of: (5) inspection and supervision and (6) intervention. The reader, at first
blush, may conclude that six is better for the plaintiff than one. After all,
why would a person not prefer to have another person owe them six duties 
rather than one? Practically, however, by imposing six sub-duties, 
conditional duties, or restricted duties, instead of recognizing one
overarching concept of a duty to exercise reasonable care, the Court 
actually narrowed the available field of relief for the plaintiff worker
because the six together are narrower than the single general duty to
exercise reasonable care.
In the next Part, we will analyze how the jurisprudence has developed 
under the six duties and further narrowed the LHWCA worker’s rights. 
First, however, let us ask why Justice White seemingly ignored § 905(b)’s 
imposition of vessel liability to a longshore worker for “negligence,”
instead turning that word into six sub-categories of fault. 
First, as noted at the outset, Congress desired to do away with the
LHWCA worker’s unseaworthiness (Sieracki) claims against the vessel, 
and it wanted to do away with that field of strict liability to the LHWCA
70. Id. at 175–76.
71. The contract provision, positive law, or custom may trigger a duty to
exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.
72. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 64, at 637–40.
73. Or four if the active control categories are viewed as occasions when there
is a general duty to exercise reasonable care, and three if the duty to intervene
triggered by contract provision, positive law, or custom is a general duty to
exercise reasonable care.
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326 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
worker.74 It seems that in Scindia, Justice White and the Court were
concerned that simply articulating a general duty of reasonable care posed
a risk of lower courts reverting to some type of strict-ish liability.75 Yet
negligence is a familiar term to all lawyers and judges, and all know the 
difference between liability based upon negligence and liability without 
fault, that is, strict liability. Moreover, Justice White’s compendium of 
particularities and pointillist duties flies in the face of Congress’s use of
the single word “negligence” in the statute.76 Articulating a general duty 
of care would not only have been consistent with the language of the 
statute, but it also would have been simpler and clearer.77 
74. The legislative history reveals Congress’s desire to do away with liability
based “unseaworthiness, non-delegable duty, and the like.”
75. See supra text accompanying note 60.
76. As noted, Justice Powell, in his concurrence, which Justice Rehnquist
joined, expressed a concern that the risk of too general a standard of care was that 
a jury would too quickly find liability and then the stevedore employer, who was
predominantly at fault, recovering all of the LHWCA benefits it had paid from
the vessel. He said:
The difficulty with a more general reasonableness standard like that
adopted by the court below is that it fails to deal with the problems of 
allocating responsibility between the stevedore and the shipowner. It
may be that it is “reasonable” for a shipowner to rely on the stevedore to
discover and avoid most obvious hazards. But when, in a suit by a
longshoreman, a jury is presented with the single question whether it was
“reasonable” for the shipowner to fail to take action concerning a
particular obvious hazard, the jury will be quite likely to find liability. If 
such an outcome were to become the norm, negligent stevedores would
be receiving windfall recoveries in the form of reimbursement for the 
statutory benefit payments made to the injured longshoremen. This
would decrease significantly the incentives toward safety of the party in
the best position to prevent injuries, and undercut the primary 
responsibility of that party for ensuring safety.
Scindia Steam Nav. Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 181 (1981) (Powell, J., 
concurring).
77. In his concurrence, which Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined, Justice
Brennan came very close to doing exactly what the text suggests. He wrote:
My views are that under the 1972 Amendments: (1) a shipowner has a
general duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances; (2) in 
exercising reasonable care, the shipowner must take reasonable steps to 
determine whether the ship’s equipment is safe before turning that
equipment over to the stevedore; (3) the shipowner has a duty to inspect
the equipment turned over to the stevedore or to supervise the stevedore
if a custom, contract provision, law or regulation creates either of those
duties; and (4) if the shipowner has actual knowledge that equipment in 
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3272020] LHSCA SECTION 905(b) AND SCINDIA
Additionally, Justice White and the Court were apparently influenced 
by the fact that the shipowner, when it hires a stevedore, is hiring a 
so-called expert to do work for it.78 Although the stevedore’s level of 
expertise is indeed relevant, it is better thought of as a factor for a 
fact-finder to consider in deciding comparative fault, rather than a 
limitation on the duty owed. We will discuss this reality further in the next 
Part.
Finally, as noted above, it may be that Justice White and the Court had
no intention that all the discussion about duty was law at all. It is possible
Justice White was merely honoring the tradition that, in admiralty in
federal court, there is no right to a jury trial absent an independent basis of
jurisdiction. Consequently, absent a jury, the judge is the fact-finder. As
fact-finder, the judge decides not only the legal duty issue, but also the 
breach issue—as fact-finder, not as lawgiver.79 In that regard, one might
view Justice White’s entire Scindia opinion as a digression on breach,
rather than an articulation of duties. Of course, that is not how the Supreme
Court itself and the lower courts have read the opinion. In the following
Parts, we discuss the post-Scindia evolution of the three particular duty 
categories and the six diminutive sub-duties.
IV. THE TURNOVER DUTIES
As said above, the Scindia turnover duty consists of two sub-duties: 
(1) a duty to exercise reasonable care to turn over to the stevedore a
reasonably safe ship; and (2) a duty to warn of risks of which the
shipowner is or should be aware. As we also noted, however, each
sub-duty comes with a condition.
The condition on the first sub-duty—the duty to exercise reasonable
care to turn over the vessel in a safe condition—is that the duty to exercise 
reasonable care requires the vessel owner to have the ship and its 
equipment “in such condition that an expert and experienced stevedore 
will be able by the exercise of reasonable care to carry on its cargo
the control of the stevedore is in an unsafe condition, and a reasonable
belief that the stevedore will not remedy that condition, the shipowner 
has a duty either to halt the stevedoring operation, to make the stevedore 
eliminate the unsafe condition, or to eliminate the unsafe condition itself.
Id. at 179 (Brennan, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 166.
79. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 
1947) (Judge Learned Hand articulating his famous negligence formula).
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328 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
operations with reasonable safety.”80 To clarify, the duty is not reasonable
care in general but reasonable care in turning the ship over to “an expert
and experienced stevedore.”81 That condition is a recognition that the
vessel is employing an expert loader and unloader, and the expert can be 
expected to anticipate certain dangerous conditions in what is, by its
nature, dangerous work. Although there is nothing per se wrong with that
realization, it merits comment, if not criticism.
Is the “expert and experienced stevedore” condition really a statement 
of duty, or is it a recognition of a factor that is relevant to the breach 
determination? Perhaps the difference is semantic;82 however, whether the
“expert and experienced stevedore” condition is a duty statement or a 
breach factor, the reality is that a judge normally cannot decide whether
the shipowner turned over the vessel in a condition that would allow an 
“expert and experienced stevedore” to do its work safely. This is because
a judge is neither an expert in vessel maintenance and operation nor an
expert in stevedoring. Instead, deciding what conditions on a vessel an
expert stevedore should expect requires the testimony of experienced
stevedores. If reasonable experts disagree, or if a fact-finder could draw 
different inferences from the testimony, then what conditions the
stevedore would expect is a decision properly reserved for the fact-finder.
A judge who decides, as a matter of law—as part of the duty 
determination—what conditions an “expert and experienced stevedore” 
should expect is going beyond his or her legal expertise.
Additionally, in deciding whether a vessel exercised ordinary care in 
turning over the ship, the decision maker may take note of the fact the 
stevedore is an expert. That does not mean the stevedore assumes the risk 
of injury or that his contributory negligence bars his recovery. Rather, the 
stevedore’s expertise is a factor in determining comparative fault. Just as
the courts are concerned about re-introducing strict liability concepts, they
should be equally careful not to allow the defenses of assumption of the
80. Scindia, 451 U.S. at 166. The Court actually made a similar statement in
Burnside Shipping. Fed. Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S.
404, 416–17 (1969).
81. Scindia, 451 U.S. at 166.
82. In this regard, the issue is similar to the so-called emergency doctrine.
When one says one has a duty to exercise reasonable care in an emergency, not of 
one’s own making, is that a statement of duty? Or, is it preferable to say that one
has a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances, and one of the
circumstances the fact-finder may consider is an emergency not of the defendant’s 
own making? Either way, the issue of whether the emergency was of the
defendant’s own making and whether the defendant acted reasonably in the 
emergency are questions for the fact-finder if reasonable minds could disagree.  
341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd  51 4/15/20  8:48 AM
   
 
 
 
  
   
  
     
 
 
  
   
   
 
 
  
    
 
    
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
       
  
  
  
     
    
 
 
 
 
3292020] LHSCA SECTION 905(b) AND SCINDIA
risk or contributory negligence to sneak into maritime law under the guise 
of the judge or jury making a no duty or no breach decision.83 
The condition on the second turnover duty—the duty to warn—might 
justly be termed a convolution, not just a condition. The vessel has a duty 
to warn:
[T]he stevedore of any hazards on the ship or with respect to its
equipment that are known to the vessel or should be known to it
in the exercise of reasonable care, that would likely be 
encountered by the stevedore in the course of his cargo operations 
and that are not known by the stevedore and would not be obvious
to or anticipated by him if reasonably competent in the
performance of his work.84 
Of course, the vessel should have a duty, as part of its general duty to
exercise reasonable care, to warn of defects of which it knows or should
know. But the last clause, however, not only conditions, but also
convolutes that duty.
The vessel—despite the duty to warn seemingly imposed by the first
clause—does not have a duty to warn of an obvious condition or of a
condition that the (expert) stevedore would anticipate. Literally, then, if 
there is a dangerous condition on the vessel of which the vessel is aware
or should be aware, the vessel is not liable if the unreasonably dangerous 
condition was obvious or should have been anticipated by the stevedore, 
even if the vessel fails to warn the stevedore of this condition. That means
the careless—we would normally say negligent—vessel that failed to warn 
of an unreasonably dangerous condition of which it knew or should have
known is not liable to an injured longshore worker. The vessel had no duty,
since the condition was obvious or should have been anticipated. Stated
otherwise, stevedore knowledge or expertise negates the vessel’s duty and 
results in no recovery. The law uses the expertise to bar recovery in a
manner reminiscent of assumption of the risk or contributory negligence,
despite the fact maritime law recognizes neither of those defenses.85 
83. It is simpler to give such advice than it may be to apply it. It is, of course,
the concern that assumption of the risk or contributory negligence would inform
results in § 905(b) cases that motivated the Second Circuit to reverse the District
Court in Scindia.
84. Scindia, 451 U.S. at 167.
85. Perhaps, relying on Sofec, the defendant could argue that the longshore
worker’s actions are a superseding cause, but that is a proximate cause argument,
not a no duty determination, and doing so would ignore a long line of maritime 
cases that refuse to recognize the assumption of the risk defense in the personal
injury case. Another analogous “defense” doctrine that seems equally spurious 
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Moreover, and just as problematically, what is “obvious” is not self-
explanatory nor self-defining. Obviousness is a heavily fact-intensive
question. What is obvious in one case is not true for all cases and for all
time—it depends upon the particular facts and situation. Once again, with
all due respect for the judiciary, a judge has little or no basis for deciding 
what is or is not obvious in the ship loading and unloading process or for
gauging what is obvious to a longshore worker in his or her workplace. 
That analysis requires an examination of the particular facts and may 
require the testimony of expert vessel owners or operators and expert 
stevedores. What is obvious is exactly the type of issue that fact-finders, 
not lawgivers, should decide. Thus, where there is a jury, the jury should 
make the decision of whether the shipowner breached its turnover duty to
exercise reasonable care. If there is no jury, the court should be cognizant
of the different issues it decides and should clearly separate those issues— 
duty and breach—in the opinion.
Making obviousness part of a duty determination invites courts to 
think that it is their job to decide, as a matter of law, what is obvious and
what is not. That determination, however, requires a detailed factual
inquiry best left to fact-finders in individual cases where reasonable minds
could differ, rather than to judges as matters of law. Further, to the extent
a court believes it has the power to decide what is obvious as part of a legal 
duty determination, it invites summary judgment motions that will force 
the parties into detailed, case specific factual analyses posing as legal duty
questions. 
Moreover, it bears emphasis that maritime law has abandoned the 
“open and obvious” defense in tort cases.86 Courts have held that the open 
and obvious defense or condition on the general duty to exercise
reasonable care is inconsistent with the abolition of contributory 
here is the “primary duty” doctrine, which occasionally but rarely raises its head 
to bar a seaman’s recovery for personal injury. The doctrine holds that an
employee may not recover the damages he or she suffers that result from the
breach of his or her employment contract. The doctrine has been limited to high-
level employees and to duties they “consciously assumed as a term of . . .
employment.” Kelly v. Sun Transp. Co., 900 F.2d 1027, 1030 (7th Cir. 1990)
(citing Walker v. Lykes Bros. S.S., 193 F.2d 772, 773 (2d Cir. 1952)). As Maraist
and Galligan wrote: “The rule generally has met with disfavor in recent
jurisprudence, which apparently limits it to cases in which the employer’s breach 
of duty was willful and was the sole cause of the injury.”MARAIST & GALLIGAN,
supra note 45, at 112–13.
86. See, e.g., Davis v. Portline Transportes Mar. Internacional, 16 F.3d 532, 
544 (3d Cir. 1994).
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3312020] LHSCA SECTION 905(b) AND SCINDIA
negligence and assumption of risk as bars to recovery in negligence 
cases.87 The same holds true for most American jurisdictions.88 
Davis v. Portline Transportes Maritime Internacional89 exemplifies
how a court should properly handle the “open and obvious” issue in a 
§ 905(b) case. In Davis, a stevedore slipped and fell on grease and ice on
the ship’s deck while offloading a cargo of cement.90 The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the vessel, finding that it had not 
breached any of the Scindia duties because, in large part, the condition was 
“open and obvious.”91 In reversing, the Third Circuit provided a very 
thorough and detailed analysis of the impropriety of applying obviousness
as a bar to recovery:
The parties and the district court all presumed that the preliminary
question with respect to the active operations duty is whether the
hazard was obvious or known to the longshore worker. . . . But we
noted in Kirsch that the obviousness determination is generally for
the jury to make. 
* * *
Rather than setting up a bar to recovery, as the district court
presumed, the obviousness of a danger, or the injured worker’s 
actual knowledge of it, is pertinent with respect to the active 
operations duty only insofar as it evinces the worker’s 
comparative fault.
* * *
When the active operations duty is involved, the Act adjusts the
vessel’s liability for obvious dangers or those dangers the 
longshore worker knows of only by the worker’s comparative 
fault. The legislative history of the 1972 amendments clearly and 
unequivocally provides that:
the admiralty concept of comparative negligence, rather than the 
common law rule as to contributory negligence, shall apply in 
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Pitre v. La. Tech Univ., 673 So. 2d 585, 596 (La. 1996); Beach
v. City of Phoenix, 667 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Ariz. 1983). The possibility that the
defect or hazard is “open and obvious” is a factor to be considered in determining 
whether the possessor’s failure to remedy the hazard or provide a warning was
unreasonable and therefore breached the standard of care; it is not a factor to be
used in determining the very existence of the duty, which is a precondition for the
exercise of the standard of care.
89. Davis, 16 F.3d 532 (3d Cir. 1994). 
90. Id. 534–36.
91. Id. at 538.
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cases where the injured employee’s own negligence may have
contributed to causing the injury. Also, the Committee intends 
that the admiralty rule which precludes the defense of
“assumption of risk” in an action by an injured employee shall 
also be applicable.92 
Turning to the turnover duty to warn, everything just said about 
obviousness applies to the vessel’s turnover duty to warn. That is, under 
the turnover duty to warn, the vessel does not have a duty to warn of an
unreasonably dangerous risk of which it knows or should know if the
stevedore would anticipate the risk. This limits the duty to warn of
unreasonably dangerous risks even further than the obviousness limitation
because even if the risk is not obvious, there is still no duty to warn if the 
stevedore should anticipate the risk. Again, how does a judge know what
risks a reasonable stevedore would anticipate? Additionally, those risks 
would seem to depend heavily on the particular factual setting which, in 
turn, would seem to require extensive testimony from those involved and
from someone, perhaps an expert, familiar with stevedoring. Furthermore, 
the determination is one for a fact-finder, not for a lawgiver. Predictably,
the turnover duty and its sub-duties have spawned further litigation,
explanation, extrapolation, and confusion.
In Howlett v. Barksdale Shipping Co.,93 the plaintiff, Albert Howlett, 
was injured while unloading a ship when he jumped down about three feet 
from the cargo and slipped and fell on a sheet of clear plastic that was
placed under the cargo. All parties agreed that the use of plastic was 
improper and that the vessel had supplied the plastic to the stevedore who
had loaded the ship in Ecuador.94 Yet in granting the vessel’s motion for
summary judgment, the district court held that Howlett had the burden of
proving the vessel had actual knowledge of the condition, and he had not
sustained the burden of establishing a material issue of fact on that point.95 
According to the court, proving the vessel provided the plastic and the
vessel’s crew was present during the loading did not give rise to an 
inference that the vessel had actual knowledge of the improper use of the
plastic.96 Moreover, the court held that Howlett had the burden of
92. Id. at 539–40, 544 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1441, 92 Cong., 2d Sess. 8 
(1972)). Davis is an active operations case, but what it says about open and 
obvious, duty, assumption of risk, and comparative fault is true in turnover cases
as well.
93. Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., 512 U.S. 92 (1994).
94. Id. at 94.
95. Id. at 95.
96. Id.
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3332020] LHSCA SECTION 905(b) AND SCINDIA
establishing the condition—the plastic—was not open and obvious, and he 
failed to carry that burden because the plastic was apparent to the crew, so
“. . . it readily transpires that this was an open and obvious condition.”97 It 
is noteworthy that the district court did not consider facts or testimony in 
reaching its open and obvious conclusion. The Court of Appeals affirmed
without opinion, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari “to resolve a 
conflict among the Circuits regarding the scope of the shipowners’ duty to
warn of latent hazards in the cargo stow, an inquiry that depends in large 
part upon the nature of the shipowners’ duty to inspect for such defects.”98 
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, noted that the turnover
duty could apply to latent hazards in the cargo stow. He said, however, the
duty was a “narrow one.”99 That is a very apt way to put it, especially
vis-à-vis the generally applicable duty to exercise reasonable care. Latent
hazards are those that are not obvious and that a competent stevedore would 
not anticipate. The Court reiterated that the vessel needs to have actual
knowledge of the hazard: “Absent actual knowledge of a hazard, then, the
duty to warn may attach only if the exercise of reasonable care would place 
upon the shipowner an obligation to inspect for, or discover, the hazard’s
existence.”100 Borrowing from the Scindia Court’s decision not to impose a
duty to inspect in the duty to intervene context, the Court refused to impose
a duty to inspect the completed stow in the turnover context.
The Court, however, remanded for further proceedings, finding that it
was premature to conclude it was undisputed the vessel did not have actual
knowledge:
There is sufficient evidence in the record to support a permissible
inference that, during the loading process, some crew members,
who might have held positions such that their knowledge should
be attributed to the vessel, did in fact observe the plastic on the
tween deck. And the District Court’s alternative theory that even 
if some crew members were aware of the condition during loading
operations, then the condition also would have been open and 
obvious to a stevedore during unloading operations, may prove
faulty as well, being premised on the state of affairs when the
vessel took on cargo, not during discharge at the port where 
97. Id. at 95 (citing Derr v. Kawasaki Kisen K. K., 835 F.2d 490 (Ca. 1987),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1007 (1988)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 105.
100. Id. at 100.
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334 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Howlett was injured.101 
Justice Kennedy noted, however, that summary judgment in the 
vessel’s favor might still be appropriate if Howlett failed to establish that
the condition—the plastic—was not obvious or a competent stevedore 
would not have anticipated the condition.102 The opinion is a refinement
of Scindia and a logical application of that decision. As a logical 
refinement of Scindia, it solves none of the problems Scindia created.
Howlett is full of undertones of assumption of the risk and contributory 
negligence. The opinion assumes a judge can determine what is and what
is not obvious or what is or is not anticipated by a competent stevedore. In
so assuming, the opinion improperly combines the duty and breach 
determinations, and it places the burden of proving that the condition was
neither obvious nor anticipated on the plaintiff.
Predictably, the obviousness exception to the turnover duty to warn 
has created significant turmoil. As anticipated, some courts ruled against 
longshore workers injured by what the courts believed was an obvious 
condition.103 Other courts have been sensibly flexible in dealing with the
draconian obvious or anticipated exceptions. In Hill v. Reederei,104 the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals indicated a shipowner might still be liable 
even if a longshore worker was injured by an open and obvious condition 
if avoiding the hazard would be “impractical” for the longshore worker 
and the vessel should have known the worker would encounter the 
101. Id. at 105–06.
102. Id. at 106.
103. See Kirksey v. Tonghai Mar., 535 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2008) (open and 
obvious exception extends to a defect in the cargo stow where there is no evidence
the shipowner negligently created a dangerous condition in the stow; rough seas
caused the cargo to move); see alsoManuel v. Cameron Offshore Boats, Inc., 103
F.3d 31 (5th Cir. 1997). There, the claimant was working for an independent 
contractor aboard the defendant’s vessel. Claimant and his supervisor knew that a
shorn mooring line was lying on the deck, and they repeatedly worked around it 
without incident. Claimant was injured when he tripped over the line. The Fifth
Circuit held that the district court did not err in concluding that the vessel owner did
not violate its “turnover” duty and was entitled to rely upon the contractor to
exercise ordinary care by “simply moving the rope out of their way.” Manuel, 103 
F.3d at 34. The district court made its decision after a bench trial. See Meyers v.
M/V Eugenio C., 919 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1990) (shipowner does not have a duty to 
warn of an open and obvious condition if the one asserting the duty to warn was in 
a better position, by virtue of training or experience, to appreciate the danger).
104. 435 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Teply v. Mobil Oil Corp., 859 F.2d 
375 (5th Cir. 1988); Thomas v. Newton Int’l Enters., 42 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 1994).
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3352020] LHSCA SECTION 905(b) AND SCINDIA
hazard.105 The Court explained, “if the longshoreman’s only alternatives
are to leave the job or face trouble for delaying the work—then the
shipowner had a duty to warn of or mitigate the hazard . . . even if it was 
open and obvious.”106 The Hill approach is a sensible realization that
sometimes it is impossible to avoid an “obvious” or “anticipated” hazard 
and still do one’s job. This approach is also a recognition of the fact-
intensive nature of the inquiry into obviousness, anticipation, and 
reasonable care. A 2017 United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision exemplifies this very practical approach to interpreting and 
applying the turnover duty and the importance of particular facts to
outcomes in individual cases.
In Manson Gulf, L.L.C. v. Modern American Recycling Service, 
Inc.,107 Manson, in the business of decommissioning oil-drilling platforms, 
acquired one such platform. Manson extracted the 50-foot tall, four-leg
platform and put the structure on a chartered barge. To facilitate moving 
the structure, Manson ordered four, two-foot by two-foot holes cut in the
platform’s grating adjacent to each of the four support legs. Manson did 
not cover or mark the holes. Modern American Recycling Service
(“MARS”) agreed to purchase and scrap the platform. Manson warned
MARS of oil on the platform’s surface but did not warn of the holes. A
MARS foreman, Smith, boarded the platform. Later, after all Manson
personnel were gone from the site, J.J. LaFleur, an independent contractor 
hired by MARS, joined him. While discussing the oil issue with Smith, 
LaFleur stepped into one of the holes and fell 50 feet to the barge’s deck. 
He died from his injuries. Manson filed a complaint seeking exoneration
or limitation. LaFleur’s surviving spouse filed claims against Manson and 
MARS, relying on § 905(b).108 The district court granted the defendants’
motions for summary judgment on all aspects of § 905(b), including the 
turnover duty.109 On the turnover duty, the district court held that Manson 
105. Hill, 435 F.3d at 410.
106. Id. The Third Circuit also pointed out that the doctrine of superseding
cause must be applied with heightened vigilance in LHWCA cases in order to
avoid undermining the remedial scheme created by the Act. Id. at 412.
107. 878 F.3d 130 (5th Cir. 2017).
108. For both the limitation proceeding and the § 905(b) action itself, it is not
obvious from the Fifth Circuit’s decision why the structure was a vessel. 
Originally, it had been a platform, not a vessel. Arguably, the fact that it was on a
barge at the time of the accident made it a vessel, but that is not entirely clear.
109. Manson Gulf, Nos. 15-3627, 15-6860, 2016 WL 3020843 (E.D. La. May
26, 2016). The case was set for trial by the judge; thus, in granting summary 
judgment, the district court had relied on Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d
1119 (5th Cir. 1978), which held that where a party made a summary judgment
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was not liable because the hole was both open and obvious and could be 
anticipated by a competent stevedore.110 The Fifth Circuit reversed,
concluding there were factual questions arising from the testimony of
MARS’ foreman, Smith.111 
The court reviewed and summarized the evidence. Smith had testified
that there was nothing obstructing LaFleur’s view of the hole; if LaFleur 
had looked, he would have seen the hole from four to eight feet away; if
he were in LaFleur’s shoes he would not have fallen; and he would expect
a decommissioned structure to contain holes.112 On the other hand, he also 
testified that the platform’s grating can play tricks on the eyes; the hole
was not easily seen until one was right on top of it; and he did not see the
hole until LaFleur fell through it.113 He also said that uncovered holes were
commonly roped off.114 After reviewing the evidence, the court noted that
the pictures submitted as evidence confirmed that the hole could play 
tricks on the eyes.115 The Manson court properly held that questions of
obviousness are fact dependent and are best answered after a full trial
because reasonable minds could differ on the obviousness of the hazard or
condition.
On remand,116 the district court decided that the hole was not open and
obvious and was “a danger that a reasonably competent stevedore would
anticipate encountering.”117 The court said that neither the decedent nor
Smith noticed the hole; that Smith testified that the hole looked like solid 
grating; that the detective who investigated the death did not see the hole
until it was pointed out to him; that shadows made the hole difficult to see 
because the grating could play tricks on one’s eyes; and that holes on
platforms are not uncommon but are usually covered.118 The court
motion in a case that was to be tried by the bench “the court may conclude on the
basis of the affidavits, depositions, and stipulations before it, that there are no
genuine issues of material fact, even though [the] decision may depend on 
inferences to be drawn from what has been incontrovertibly proved.” Id. at 1123– 
24. The court, however, may exercise this inference-drawing function only when 
“the evidentiary facts are not disputed” and “there are no issues of witness 
credibility.” Id.
110. Manson Gulf, 878 F.3d at 135.
111. Id. at 136–37.
112. Id. at 135–36.
113. Id. at 136.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. No. 2:15-cv-06860, 2018 WL 4002137 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2018).
117. Id. at *5.
118. Id.
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3372020] LHSCA SECTION 905(b) AND SCINDIA
awarded $4,210,756 in damages.119 The Fifth Circuit affirmed on § 905(b)
liability120 and other critical points, albeit vacating the district court’s
prejudgment of interest on future damages.121 
In sum, whether there is a violation of the turnover duty, what 
conditions are “open and obvious,” and what a reasonable stevedore would
expect on a vessel are not legal decisions. They are fact dependent, and 
courts should be wary to grant summary judgment if doing so involves the 
judge making decisions on key issues beyond judicial expertise and
dependent upon the nuanced context of the environment on board or 
around the relevant vessel. 
V. THE ACTIVE CONTROL DUTIES
Recall that the active control duty consists of two separate sub-duties: 
(1) the active involvement duty; and (2) the active control duty.122 The
active involvement duty arises where the vessel participates in or takes
control of cargo operations. The active control duty involves situations
where the stevedore worker is harmed by a risk in an area still under the 
active control of the vessel. Both prongs essentially devolve into a duty to
exercise reasonable care in the described situations. Giving the duty a 
special name adds little or no substance, but perhaps is necessary, given 
the manner in which the Scindia Court undermined the general duty of
care under § 905(b). There is much less confusion associated, or
potentially associated, with the active control duties than with the turnover 
duties, especially the duty to warn.
Notably, unlike with the turnover duties, the obviousness of a hazard 
is not a complete bar to shipowner liability under the active control
duties.123 Also, unlike in the turnover duty to warn, if cargo operations
have begun, and the shipowner is actively involved in the operations, the
vessel may be held liable to a stevedore worker if it has constructive—not
just actual—knowledge of the hazard.124 In essence, the active control and 
operations sub-duties are basically duties to exercise reasonable care under
the circumstances without limitation or restriction.
119. Id. at *6.
120. Manson Gulf, LLC v. LaFleur, 784 Fed. Appx. 233 (5th Cir. 2019).
121. Id.
122. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 64, at 636.
123. Serbin v. Bora Corp., 96 F.3d 66 (3d Cir. 1996). 
124. Lampkin v. Liberia Athene Transp. Co., 823 F.2d 1497 (11th Cir. 1987).
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338 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
VI. THE DUTY TO INTERVENE
The duty to intervene, like the turnover and active control duties, also 
consists of two sub-duties: (1) the duty to supervise and inspect, which is 
triggered by a contract provision, positive law, or custom; and (2) the duty 
to intervene, which is triggered by the vessel’s knowledge of the 
stevedore’s obviously improvident judgment. One will recall that Justice
White in Scindia considered the duty to intervene the most vexing. The 
fact that the vessel has hired the stevedore, who is an expert in loading and 
unloading, seems a most relevant factor to consider when deciding 
whether the failure to intervene is a breach of the vessel’s duty. A vessel
should be able to rely upon the stevedore to do its work properly, and it is
perhaps for this reason the Court in Scindia said that absent contract
provision, positive law, or custom to the contrary, the vessel owner has no
duty generally to inspect or supervise the cargo operations. Post-Scindia
jurisprudence had rarely applied the custom exception.
The second sub-duty to intervene, according to the Scindia Court, 
arises when the stevedore employer’s judgment is:
[S]o obviously improvident that [the vessel owner], if it knew of 
the defect and that [the stevedore] was continuing to use [the 
dangerous work method or equipment], should have realized the 
[condition] presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the 
longshoremen.125 
This is a difficult burden to overcome, and perhaps that is as it should be, 
as a vessel should normally be able to rely upon the stevedore to do its
work in the way it chooses. Is it better, however, to have that guideline— 
that the vessel should normally be able to rely upon the stevedore to do its 
work the way it chooses—as a part of the statement of duty (law) or as a
factor for the fact-finder in determining breach?
Courts have held that mere knowledge of a dangerous condition— 
which the stevedore created—does not normally trigger the duty to
intervene.126 An important consideration, then, is when does vessel
knowledge shift from mere knowledge of a dangerous condition to
knowledge of a dangerous condition and of the stevedore’s “obviously 
improvident” 127 judgment in continuing to work around the hazard. The 
125. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 175–76 
(1981).
126. Singleton v. Guangzhou Ocean Shipping Co., 79 F.3d 26 (5th Cir. 1996).
127. The use of the word “obviously” here is obviously ironic.
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3392020] LHSCA SECTION 905(b) AND SCINDIA
answer to this question clearly appears to depend upon the facts of each
case, and therefore is a question of breach, not duty per se.128 
Notably, in Scindia, the Court itself cited a number of Safety and 
Health Regulations for Longshoring129 in discussing, without deciding,
whether the vessel had an obligation to repair the winch. Importantly, and
consistent with the theme of this Article, Justice White said: “The trial 
court, and where appropriate the jury, should thus be made aware of the
scope of the stevedore’s duty under the positive law.”130 The quote
indicates the Court’s understanding that even while it may have been 
conditioning or narrowing the general duty to exercise reasonable care,
decisions about breach of duty were for the fact-finder where reasonable 
minds could disagree.
In the next Parts, we will address some general issues that have arisen
in interpreting § 905(b) and then conclude with some recommendations for
courts going forward.
VII. POTENTIAL DEFENDANTS IN A SECTION 905(B) ACTION
Section 905(b) begins: “In the event of injury to a person covered 
under this chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel . . . .”131 In many 
cases, the defendant in the § 905(b) action will be the vessel’s owner; 
however, the statute is not limited to the owner. The action extends to
anyone with a sufficient relationship to a vessel. Thus, an injured LHWCA
worker may have an action against someone other than the owner of the
vessel. He or she may have an action against a bareboat charterer, who will 
normally be treated like the owner.132 He or she may have an action against
a time charterer; however, in that case, the court must be careful to define
the obligations owed consistently with the obligations of a time charterer,
which are less extensive than those of an owner or bare boat charterer.133 
128. See, e.g., O’Hara v. Weeks Marine, Inc., 294 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2002) (the
plaintiff raised factual issues precluding summary judgment on the duty to 
intervene concerning whether the defendant had actual knowledge of a risk 
created by a dangerous condition and a high probability that the stevedore would
not exercise reasonable care to protect its employees).
129. Scindia, 451 U.S. at 176.
130. Id.
131. 33 U.S.C.A. § 905(b) (West 2018).
132. Jones v. Sanko S.S. Co., 148 F. Supp. 3d 374 (D.N.J. 2015).
133. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Ma-Ju Marine Servs., 830 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 
1987).
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340 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
The same is true if the “vessel” defendant is sued in some capacity other
than owner or bare boat charterer.134 
A. Dual Capacity Employers
A LHWCA worker may sue his employer in tort in its vessel capacity, 
that is, owner, bareboat charterer, time charterer, voyage charterer, owner
pro hac vice, et cetera.135 That is, the § 905(b) vessel negligence claim
trumps the exclusive remedy provisions of the LHWCA, and the LHWCA
worker may bring a vessel negligence claim against his or her employer in
its vessel capacity, independent of any workers’ compensation claim.136 Of 
course, the second and third sentences of § 905(b) limit the availability of
the § 905(b) vessel negligence action against the employer. The second
sentence arguably limits the § 905(b) vessel negligence action against the
employer where the employer is doing its own stevedoring services and the
employee stevedore is injured by his or her co-employee stevedores.137 The
third sentence more clearly provides that shipbuilders, ship repairers, and 
ship breakers have no vessel negligence claims against their employers in 
any capacity. Other LHWCA workers—stevedores outside the scope of the
second sentence and construction workers, oil field workers, and others
covered by § 905(b)—may bring a vessel negligence action against their
employers. In any case, where the action is allowed, it is against the
employer in its vessel owner capacity, not in any other capacity, as in an
employer capacity,138 although it may be extremely difficult to determine
the capacity in which the employer–defendant committed the tort at issue.
B. Scindia Extended
Scindia, of course, interpreted and applied § 905(b) vis-à-vis stevedores
loading a ship and, like any court decision, it arose out of particular facts.
The three (or six) articulated duties all dealt with that context: what
obligation does a vessel have when it turns over the vessel to an expert
stevedore? How is the vessel’s obligation affected if it involves itself in
operations after the turnover or if the stevedore is injured by something still
under the vessel owner’s control? When should the vessel intervene in the
stevedore’s operations? All the duties relate to stevedores. All LHWCA
workers, however, are not stevedores, and many LHWCA workers who are
134. Such as a voyage charterer.
135. 33 U.S.C. § 902(21) (2018).
136. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1981).
137. See supra note 45.
138. SeeMorehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit, J/V, 97 F.3d 603 (1st Cir. 1990).
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3412020] LHSCA SECTION 905(b) AND SCINDIA
not stevedores also have the right to bring a § 905(b) vessel negligence
action. Yet the lower courts have greatly expanded Scindia to cover many
classes of workers and many situations to which Scindia’s framework
clearly has no application, a fact that is evidenced by the tortured analysis
in some of those decisions.
The LHWCA worker may be a construction worker who is injured
during the course and scope of employment on navigable waters.139 The
worker may be an oil field worker who is covered because he or she works
on navigable waters but does not attain seaman status.140 The worker may 
be a construction worker or repairperson engaged in manufacturing or
working on equipment or facilities essential to the loading and unloading
process but is not actually engaged in the loading and unloading process.141 
There may still be others.
What is the obligation of the vessel to these non-stevedore LHWCA
workers? That is, what duty does the vessel owe to a non-stevedore 
LHWCA worker? It should be reasonable care under the circumstances.
After all, as we said above, that is what negligence is. Applying the Scindia
framework is problematic because the Scindia Court articulated all of its
“duties” in a case involving an expert stevedore hired to load and unload
ships. Different considerations may be, and often are, at stake in different 
factual settings. Once again, this is a reason to apply overarching concepts
of reasonable care rather than the particularized Scindia sub-duties.
Pointedly, the Supreme Court has never applied the Scindia framework
outside of the limited context of stevedores loading and unloading cargo 
from ships. Thus, there is no high court authority for applying Scindia 
when the claim does not involve stevedores.
Especially irksome are those decisions applying Scindia to the dual 
capacity suit. That is, several circuits have stated that Scindia provides the 
analytical framework when any LHWCA worker sues his or her employer
for vessel negligence.142 It is troublesome because, logically, the employer
has not turned over the vessel to a third-party stevedore whose employee
is injured. It has maintained control of the vessel itself, which then 
automatically implicates the active control duty. Additionally, the duty to 
intervene seems inapposite because the employer is the one supervising 
the injured worker in the first place. The courts should not apply Scindia 
139. See Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459
U.S. 297 (1983); Bienvenu v. Texaco, Inc., 164 F.3d 901 (5th Cir. 1999).
140. See, e.g., Smith v. Seacor Marine LLC, 495 F.3d 182 (5th Cir. 2007).
141. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Schwalb, 493 U.S. 40 (1989).
142. See Morehead, 97 F.3d 603; Fanetti v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 678 F.2d 424 
(2d Cir. 1982).
341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd  64 4/15/20  8:48 AM
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
   
 
 
    
   
   
  
  
   
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
    
    
 
   
 
    
 
    
 
  
 
    
 
    
  
342 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
to dual capacity cases; they should impose a general duty of reasonable 
care under the circumstances.
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION—STOP THE 
PENDULUM
Scindia interpreted the single word “negligence” in § 905(b) of the
LHWCA and turned the relatively straightforward duty to exercise
reasonable care under the circumstances into three duty headings with six
sub-duties. It is all too complex. By narrowing the general duty of due
care, the Court improperly expanded the duty inquiry—a question of
law—and, in turn, reduced the role of the fact-finder. This is particularly
troublesome when the inquiry turns on fact-specific situations, as it often
does. Duty determinations that are too fact-specific create ambiguous and
unnecessary “law.” Even in cases where the judge will be the fact-finder,
the clear articulation of what the judge is deciding—duty or breach—is
important because a judge deciding a motion for summary judgment who 
believes the question is duty may be too quick to grant the motion where
there are factual disputes. It is also important because misstatements about
duty in cases tried to a judge may be relied upon in jury cases for authority 
concerning the proper allocation of decision-making authority.
Scindia is also troublesome because the six sub-duties it created are 
not so neatly categorical because they overlap. For instance, in Scindia, 
the evidence was that the winch, which was part of the ship’s gear, was
malfunctioning. If it had been malfunctioning at the time the stevedore
first came on board, would that be a violation of the turnover duty? It
would seem to be a violation of the turnover duty even if the vessel
expected that the stevedore would notice the defect. Moreover, while the
stevedore was operating the winch, if the vessel owner still had the right
to exercise control over the winch and repair it, would that trigger the 
active control duty because the winch was essentially subject to the control 
of both the vessel and the stevedore? Finally, whatever one concludes from
the previous questions, is a breach of the duty to intervene easier for the 
LHWCA worker to prove when the defective equipment the stevedore
used belongs to the vessel, was in disrepair at turnover, and was not 
repaired by the vessel either before turnover or during the stevedoring 
operations? It seems that it should be, and the combination of fault
described above constitutes a failure to exercise due care under the
circumstances. Breaking the basic duty issue into subparts or sub-duties
distracts one from the overall combined negligence of the vessel. The
focused or pointillist analysis does not clarify; it obfuscates.
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3432020] LHSCA SECTION 905(b) AND SCINDIA
Consequently, our first and most basic recommendation would be to 
jettison Scindia and replace it with a general duty of reasonable care under 
the circumstances. This would be consistent with the language of the 
statute—“negligence”—and would simplify things because judges and
juries clearly are familiar with “negligence,” the general duty to exercise
due care. Moreover, our recommendation makes clear that the issue of
whether or not a vessel exercised reasonable care is a fact-intensive, case
specific determination. As such, the decision is a mixed question of fact
and law for the fact-finder. The duty is simple—reasonable care under the
circumstances—and the breach decision is for the fact-finder.143 
In addition, some of the Scindia sub-duties, particularly the turnover 
duty, the duty to warn, and the duty to intervene, use language that is 
inherently vague and requires factual inquiries and possibly expert 
testimony. First, the turnover duty to provide a safe ship ensures that a 
vessel has an obligation to “have the ship and its equipment in such 
condition that an expert and experienced stevedore will be able by the
exercise of reasonable care to carry on its cargo operations with reasonable
safety.”144 A court does not know what condition an expert and 
experienced stevedore requires to be able to do its work safely. This, at its
core, is a factual determination, and one that usually requires expert
testimony. It is not a duty determination that a court can make without
looking at the particular factual context and hearing the expert testimony,
considerations that are improper at the summary judgment stage.
The duty to warn hinges on the condition neither being obvious to nor 
anticipated by the longshore worker. Once again, what is obvious or
anticipated requires a detailed factual analysis.145 It is a breach question,
not a duty or law question. The court cannot decide it based on rule and
policy, and its decision about whether a particular hazard is obvious or 
anticipated is not applicable to a broad range of other cases and situations.
Further, the inquiry into what is obvious or anticipated will often require 
expert testimony.
Finally, the duty to intervene is only triggered if the stevedore’s
judgment about its method of operations is “obviously improvident.”146 
What is obviously improvident, once again, depends upon the facts of the 
particular case. It is not a legal decision, such as the scope of a statute. 
143. Of course, in many admiralty cases, the fact-finder will be the judge
because in federal court, absent an independent basis for federal jurisdiction, such 
as diversity of citizenship, there is no right to a jury trial.
144. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 167 (1981).
145. See, e.g., Davis v. Portline Transportes Mar. Internacional, 16 F.3d 532, 
540 (3d Cir. 1994).
146. Scindia, 451 U.S. at 175.
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344 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Whether someone is being obviously improvident in a particular case is
limited to that situation. Additionally, like the knowledge of an expert
stevedore, the obviousness of a risk, or whether a risk should be anticipated,
will often require expert testimony. It is not a matter of legal analysis; it is a
matter of factual analysis. Therefore, summary judgments should be rare.
In addition, any possibility that recognizing a general duty of due care
would bring Sieracki strict liability in through the back door has long passed.
A LHWCA worker has not had an unseaworthiness action against a vessel for
46 years. There is little risk a court would reinvigorate the unseaworthiness
claim today through liberal interpretations of “negligence.” Moreover,
negligence is a common and well understood concept. There is little risk that 
a court would be misled into turning it into strict liability in the vessel context.
Naturally, there is only one Court that could jettison the overly
detailed duty dynamic instituted in Scindia. Until the day when the United
States Supreme Court decides to revisit Scindia, we concede that its three-
part/six-part duty dissection will continue to govern. The pendulum has
not only swung far from Sieracki strict liability; it has swung far past the
negligence standard Congress articulated.
In the meantime, courts can and should do several things when 
deciding § 905(b) cases. Following the recommendations set forth below 
will be consistent with § 905(b) “negligence,” avoid doctrinal confusion,
more appropriately articulate decision-making responsibility, and avoid 
improper summary judgments based on a no duty conclusion where the
issue is really breach and there are factual questions. All of our 
recommendations urge courts to be cognizant of the fact-specific nature of 
§ 905(b) cases and of the fact-dependent decisions inherent in making
determinations about the applicability of many of the Scindia duty 
conditions or qualifiers.
First, in interpreting and applying the turnover duty to provide a
reasonably safe ship, courts should be careful not to make hasty “no duty” 
decisions. Courts should not be too quick in deciding what condition of a
vessel and its equipment allows an “expert and experienced stevedore”
through “the exercise of reasonable care to carry on its cargo operations
with reasonable safety.”147 Taking into consideration the fact that the
stevedore is an expert is appropriate, since common sense indicates that 
when someone retains an expert to do anything, they can rely on that
expert’s ability to know what they are doing and how to do it and thereby
minimize risk. At the same time, the contours of the acceptable condition 
of the vessel for the expert and experienced stevedore is beyond the 
knowledge and experience of the judge. What constitutes an acceptable
147. Id. at 167.
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3452020] LHSCA SECTION 905(b) AND SCINDIA
condition is a fact-specific issue, and one that will often require testimony
from both eyewitness and often experts. Thus, a determination that the ship
was or was not in an acceptable condition for an expert and experienced
stevedore is a case specific, factual question for the fact-finder. It is not a 
purely a legal decision for a judge. Consequently, courts should be hesitant 
to grant “no duty” summary judgment motions on the basic turnover duty 
unless reasonable minds could not differ about what is an acceptable
condition to allow an expert and experienced stevedore to reasonably and 
safely conduct its work.
Similar observations apply to the turnover duty to warn. When deciding
what risks are “obvious” or should be “anticipated” by an experienced 
stevedore, courts should be cognizant of the reality that obviousness and the
risk expectations of the stevedore are fact-specific matters that will vary
widely from case to case and risk to risk.148 There are also matters beyond the
knowledge of the typical judge and that may require expert testimony.
Consequently, once again, judges should be wary of granting summary 
judgment motions concluding the defendant does not owe the plaintiff a duty
to warn because a condition was obvious or anticipated. Those decisions turn 
on the facts, may require expert testimony, and are best reserved for the fact-
finders. The Fifth Circuit’s decision inManson Gulf, L.L.C. is a fine example 
of a court that carefully considered the evidence before it and properly
determined that there were factual questions on whether the risk—the holes
in the platform floor—was obvious or should have been anticipated.
The active control duties are perhaps the most straightforward, since both 
are basically the duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. The
duty to intervene is more akin to the turnover duty. What is or is not
“obviously improvident” stevedore judgment is not a broad, policy-based
legal question. It is fact-based and dependent upon context and, as such, not
typically well-suited for resolution on a motion for summary judgment.
Courts should also be wary of inflexibly applying the Scindia analytical
framework beyond the stevedore setting in which it arose. The Scindia Court
framed all of the articulated duties in terms of what duty the vessel owed an
expert stevedore hired to load or unload a ship. Other LHWCA workers, such
as construction workers and oil field workers, while experts in construction or
natural resources exploration and development, may be much less familiar
than a stevedore with vessels qua vessels, that is, vessels as vessels. What
vessel conditions are obvious to or anticipated by these non-stevedore experts,
or what constitutes obviously improvident judgment by them, may be very
different from what is obvious to, anticipated by, or obviously improvident
judgment by a stevedore.
148. Id.
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Judge Morgan’s decision in Rhodes v. Genesis Marine, LLC of
Delaware149 is a fine example of the approach we articulate. There, the 
plaintiff, an electrician, was employed by a contractor to repair the
defendant’s barge. To do his work, he had to go below deck, which required
him to “remove a grated opening to enter the bilge of the barge. The opening
consisted of a cut-off piece of the grating.”150 That is, the grating, or hatch
cover, was unhinged. Thus, every time the plaintiff sought to go below deck,
he had to remove the grating, or hatch cover, begin to climb down a ladder,
and in the process replace the grating above him. While climbing down the
ladder on the day in question, the grating got caught in some welding cables,
and the hatch cover fell into the hole, causing the plaintiff to fall and suffer
serious injuries. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant, alleging vessel
negligence under § 905(b). The defendant moved for summary judgment on
all of the relevant Scindia duties. Judge Morgan denied the motion.151 
On the turnover duty, Judge Morgan held that there were factual issues 
whether the defendant violated the duty to “remove a grated opening to
enter the bilge of the barge.”152 As to the active control duties, Judge
Morgan determined that there were factual questions whether defendant 
had maintained active control of the area. And, finally, Judge Morgan held 
that there were factual questions concerning the duty to intervene and what 
knowledge the defendant had.153 In so holding, the court carefully 
reviewed deposition testimony and displayed sensitivity to the nuances of
the factual context within the industry.
In conclusion, with the passage of § 905(b), a pendulum, which after
Sieracki had swung very much in favor of the worker, swung back in favor 
of vessels. With the failure of the Scindia decision to define vessel 
negligence as reasonable care under the circumstances, and instead as six
particularized sub-duties under three duty headings, the pendulum has
swung too far in the vessel’s favor. It is time for the pendulum to find its
resting place in the middle—a place where the vessel owes the LHWCA 
worker a general duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. 
Until the Supreme Court brings the pendulum swing to a stop, courts are
urged to remember that facts and industry expertise, rather than cold logic, 
drive the results under Scindia, and, as a result, courts should exercise 
great caution in granting summary judgments finding no duty in § 905(b) 
actions.
149. No. 18-746, 2019 WL 3081699 (E.D. La. June 15, 2019).
150. Id. 
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